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ABSTRACT 
 
The switch from contributory to comparative negligence is thought to have been 
motivated primarily out of a concern for justice.  We offer a different perspective.  
Language in state supreme court decisions suggests that some judges thought the 
switch would reduce appeal rates.  We hypothesize that courts were more likely to 
make the switch when their appellate caseloads are relatively high.  To examine this, 
we estimate hazard models, showing that states with appellate courts where 
caseloads grew relatively faster made the switch more quickly, and the effect was 
more pronounced for the switch to the pure, as opposed to the modified, form of 
comparative negligence.   
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The economic analysis of law struggles with finding a convincing economic rationale 
for the widespread adoption of comparative negligence in the United States in the 
period 1969-1985.1 First, it is still unclear whether comparative negligence creates 
better incentives for parties to adopt efficient care than contributory negligence.2  
Also, the alleged risk-spreading virtue of comparative negligence is questionable. 
Given the availability of third-party insurance, there are better alternatives available 
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to spread the risk of accidental harm.3 Finally, comparative negligence is generally 
considered to generate higher costs per case. For example, White (1989) argues that 
comparative negligence seems to generate higher litigation and administrative costs 
than the traditional negligence rules because courts must decide on the degree of 
negligence by both parties and not just whether each party was negligent.4   
 
Curran (1992) provides an interest group model to explain the timing of the switch 
from contributory to comparative negligence in the United States.5  He argues that of 
all the potential interest groups, only manufacturers and lawyers had a sustained 
interest in comparative negligence. For most of the twentieth century, manufacturers 
stood to lose from the adoption of comparative negligence, while the legal profession 
stood to gain. However, the adoption of strict product liability in many states from 
the mid-1960’s onwards eliminated the resistance of manufacturers, which enabled 
lawyers to push successfully for the adoption of comparative negligence. Curran 
provides some empirical support for this argument.  It is a puzzle, however, why 
these interests were important in determining the switch to comparative negligence, 
but were unable to stave off the movement toward strict product liability, which 
would be seemingly unattractive to both the lawyers and the manufacturers by 
Curran’s rationale.   
 
In this article, we provide a different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
perspective.  We argue that comparative negligence, especially in its pure form, was 
used to mitigate appellate caseloads. Our hypothesis is that states with larger 
supreme court caseloads had a stronger incentive to switch to comparative 
negligence.  This hypothesis is based on the following insights. First, appellate 
caseloads started to rise dramatically in the 1960s. 6,7  This increase was much larger 
and started earlier in some states than in others. Second, supreme courts with large 
increases in caseloads looked for ways to decrease their caseloads. Third, a switch 
from contributory negligence to comparative negligence was expected to reduce the 
numbers of appeals since the harshness of contributory negligence led many courts 
to create a complex patchwork of exceptions which often gave rise to an appeal.8   
 
                                               
3 See e.g. White (1989).   
4 See also Landes and Posner (1987); Shavell (1987); Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2001). See, however, De 
Mot (2011), who shows that the litigation costs are not necessarily larger under comparative 
negligence.  
5 See also Rubin (2001), Zywicki (2000). 
6 Note that appellate judgeships have more than doubled in the period 1965-1980, but they have 
grown much more slowly than the volume of appeals. See Marvell and Kuykendall (1980). 
7 This was not only the case in state Supreme Courts, but also in the US Supreme Court. In 1951, there 
were 1,200 new cases in the US Supreme Court. In 1971, the number had reached 3,600. See Federal 
Judicial Center (1972).   
8 Note that tort claims make up a substantial part of all appellate court filings.   
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The next section provides some further background on contributory and 
comparative negligence and on the incentives of the judiciary necessary to motivate 
our empirical investigation. Section 3 offers some background on the data. Section 4 
contains the empirics. Section 5 concludes.  
  
  
  
2. Negligence rules, appeal rates and the judiciary 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, our hypothesis is based on three elements. We 
provide more details on caseloads in later sections. In this section, we focus on the 
judiciary’s incentive to reduce caseloads and on the difference in appeal rates under 
contributory and comparative negligence. 
 
 
2.1. The incentives of the judiciary 
 
Some studies have concluded that state appellate courts managed to keep abreast of 
the caseload explosion of the 1960s and 1970s by making numerous and varied 
changes to their personnel, structure, and procedure.9 We argue that supreme courts 
have also made changes in substantive law to keep caseloads under control. This fits 
into a line of research that argues that judges are rational utility maximizers with 
relatively weak performance incentives and constraints on their decision-making, at 
least at the highest levels. This issue has been stressed by Cooter (1983) and Posner 
(1993). Both authors assume that judges seek to minimize effort subject to various 
institutional constraints. Cooter assumes that judges providing private services have 
a financial incentive to increase their caseload to the extent it increases their income. 
In Posner’s approach, focusing on federal judges, income is fixed and can hence not 
be increased by more effort. For Posner judicial utility is a function of income, status, 
and leisure. Since the income of judges is largely fixed, maximizing leisure becomes 
especially important, conditional on maintaining status levels (Posner 1993; Stras 
2006).10 Posner further predicts that judges who have reached a high income level 
(e.g. Supreme Court justices) will prefer to maximize leisure.11 Furthermore, “the 
opportunities for a leisured judicial life, especially at the appellate level, are 
abundant” (Posner, 2008, 61). Hence one can expect judges to try to reduce their 
workload. 
 
                                               
9 See e.g. Marvell (1989).   
10 The importance of maximizing leisure for judges was recently repeated by Posner (see Posner 2008). 
11 In Posner’s words: “I therefore predict that a higher judicial salary is likely to reduce the amount of 
work done by existing judges” (Posner 1993). 
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In theory, judges confronted with an increased workload could maximize leisure by 
simply deciding fewer cases. This would unavoidably lead to increased court 
congestion and a backlog of cases. This could harm the reputation of judges and will 
likely be avoided (Helland and Klick, 2007; Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004). Judges 
could also lobby the legislator for more judges to deal with increasing workloads. 
However, this could reduce the prestige of the judges as more people attain the 
position. The judiciary will then look for alternative ways to reduce its workload 
according to Posner’s model of judicial behavior.  
 
There is some empirical evidence supporting this.  For example, Helland and Klick 
(2007) show that judges in class action cases have an incentive to easily grant the 
attorney’s fee request in order to terminate cases rapidly, thus avoiding court 
congestion. Research from Israel also shows that judges, for reputational reasons, 
will avoid a large case backlog and hence will dispose of more cases when the 
caseload increases (Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004). Other research shows that a 
higher workload increases the probability of retirement of judges (see e.g. Nixon and 
Haskin 2000; Spirggs and Wahlbeck 1995).12  
 
 
2.2. Appeal rates under contributory and comparative negligence 
 
Turning to the third element of our hypothesis, a switch to comparative negligence, 
especially the pure form, was regarded by commentators and judges as being 
capable of reducing appellate caseloads. Before the widespread adoption of 
comparative negligence, many state courts had tried to reduce the harshness of 
contributory negligence by creating a patchwork of exceptions to avoid its 
application.13 For example, many courts recognized that contributory negligence 
does not bar recovery when the defendant’s conduct can be considered gross 
negligence. This approach, however, was widely recognized to lead to endless 
appeals because courts could not define “slight,” “ordinary,” and “gross” negligence 
with sufficient clarity.14  The “last clear chance” doctrine provides another example. 
This doctrine makes the last person who could have reasonably avoided an accident 
liable.15 Prosser note the great difficulties this doctrine has caused both judges and 
lawyers.16 So according to many commentators, interpreting and applying the 
patchwork of exceptions led to a tremendous waste of judicial resources17 and 
resulted in enormous confusion among and within the various states18.  This 
                                               
12 For a summary of this literature see Stras, 2006. 
13 See Mills (2002).   
14 See e.g. Green (1944), at 50-53; Malone (1945), at 141; Prosser (1953), at 17-18. 
15 See Wittman (1998). 
16 Prosser (1951, 437 n. 99). 
17 See Mills (2002).   
18 Prosser (1951, at 428). 
 5 
approach complicates the application of the law and increases the appellate caseload 
considerably.  
 
Even without the complex patchwork of exceptions, there are good reasons to 
suspect that comparative negligence is likely to reduce the appellate caseload 
(especially in its pure form). The straightforward reason is that under contributory 
negligence the plaintiff either wins or loses all.  Hence, the incentive of the losing 
party to appeal may be large. Comparative negligence presents a more moderate 
approach compared to the “all or nothing” character of contributory negligence.  
Hence, comparative negligence may reduce the incentives of the parties to file an 
appeal. Suppose for example that the trial court only holds the defendant liable.  
Under all three rules (contributory negligence, pure comparative negligence and 
modified comparative negligence), the defendant bears the entire loss. Only she can 
have an incentive to appeal. The incentive for the defendant to appeal is clearly 
greater under contributory negligence than under comparative negligence.   Under 
contributory negligence, the defendant has two possibilities to fully escape bearing 
any part of the loss: if he convinces the appellate court that he didn’t act negligently, 
or if he convinces the appellate court that the plaintiff acted negligently. Under 
comparative negligence, the defendant only escapes bearing the full loss if he 
convinces the appellate court that he didn’t act negligently. If he can only show that 
the plaintiff acted negligently as well, he will not fully escape bearing the loss.  The 
incentive to appeal is clearly intermediate under modified comparative negligence.   
 
Supreme court judges were also well aware that comparative negligence was likely 
to reduce appellate caseloads.19 In the Supreme Court decision in which Michigan 
adopted pure comparative negligence, Justice Williams wrote: “We acknowledge 
that even under the `pure’ form of comparative negligence there will be appeals 
concerning the percentage of award, but it is undoubtedly more compelling to 
appeal when you have been awarded nothing than when you have received some 
compensation”.20  Note also that courts treat jury determinations of fault percentages 
to be findings of fact subject to minimal judicial review (see e.g. Woods and Deere, 
1996). Regarding the choice between pure and modified comparative negligence, in 
the Supreme Court decision in which California adopted pure comparative 
negligence, Judge Sullivan wrote: “We also consider significant the experience of the 
State of Wisconsin, which until recently was considered the leading exponent of the 
‘50 percent’ [i.e., modified comparative negligence] system. There that system led to 
numerous appeals on the narrow but crucial issue whether plaintiff's negligence was 
equal to defendant's….”.21 
                                               
19 Of course, we do not expect Supreme Court judges to explicitly acknowledge that reducing 
appellate caseloads was a reason for making the switch from contributory to comparative negligence.  
20 Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511. 
21 Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 C3d 804. See also Prosser (1953, 491-492), who wrote: “The practical 
effect has been very similar to that of 'slight' and 'gross' negligence. Again appeals have multiplied, in 
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Furthermore, under the expectation that pure comparative negligence is the form 
that is more  likely to reduce workload, one would anticipate that courts will adopt 
the pure form while legislatures will adopt the modified form.  To a large extent, this 
is indeed what happened.  Nine of the twelve states that changed judicially adopted 
a pure form.  Twenty-two of the twenty-seven states that changed through 
legislation adopted a modified form. 
 
Of course, in some types of cases, comparative negligence may increase the incentive 
to appeal. We now present a more formal model which shows under which 
circumstances this will be the case.  After that, we look at the parties' incentives to 
file claims, since this influences the number of appeals as well.  
 
 
2.2.1. Model 
 
We examine the incentives to appeal in 4 situations which cover the full range of 
possible decisions of the court of first instance: (1) The trial court found that both 
parties were negligent; (2) The trial court found that only the defendant was 
negligent; (3) The trial court found that neither party was negligent; and (4) The trial 
court found that only the plaintiff was negligent. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume away trial costs and focus on judgments in the first instance courts and 
expected judgments in the appeal courts.  
  
1. The trial court holds both parties negligent. 
Under contributory negligence, the plaintiff will bear the entire loss. Only she may 
have an incentive to appeal. If the plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals – J. If 
the plaintiff appeals, her pay-off equals (1-(1-a).b)(-J) + (1-a).b.(J-J)= – J  + (1-a).b.J, 
with a the probability that the appeal court will hold the plaintiff negligent given 
that the trial court did, and b the probability that the appeal court will hold the 
defendant negligent given that the trial court did. The difference between appealing 
and not appealing for the plaintiff equals (1-a).b.J.  
 
Under pure comparative negligence, the parties will share the loss. Both may have 
an incentive to appeal.  If the plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals – s.J, with s 
being the share the plaintiff bears herself in case the trial court decides both parties 
                                                                                                                                                  
which the court is asked to determine whether the particular conduct of the plaintiff is fault at least 
'equal' to that of the defendant. Since this must depend not only upon all circumstances of the case as 
they affect the conduct of both parties, but upon a comparison of one with the other, it is obvious that 
each decision must be upon the individual facts, and that either the losing defendant or the losing 
plaintiff has ample encouragement to raise the issue. It is not surprising that there is no semblance of 
consistency to be discerned in cases of the same general type.” 
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are negligent.  If the plaintiff appeals, her pay-off equals (1-b).(-J) + (1-a).b.(J-J) + a.b.(-
s’.J) = -(1-b).J – a.b.s’.J, with s’ being the share that the plaintiff bears herself in case 
the appeal court decides both parties are negligent. The difference between 
appealing and not appealing for the plaintiff equals  –(1-b).J + (s-a.b.s’).J. Now we 
look at the incentives of the defendant to appeal. If the defendant does not appeal, 
her pay-off equals  - (1-s).J. If the defendant appeals, her pay-off equals  – (1-a).b.J – 
a.b.(1-s’).J.  The difference between appealing and not appealing equals  –(1-a).b.J – 
(a.b.(1-s’)-(1-s)).J.    
 
Under modified comparative negligence, we need to distinguish between the 
situation in which the trial court thought that (1) the plaintiff’s negligence was 
greater that the defendant’s negligence and (2) the defendant’s negligence was 
greater that the plaintiff’s negligence. In the first case, the plaintiff bears the entire 
loss. Only she could have an incentive to appeal. If the plaintiff does not appeal, her 
pay-off equals – J. If the plaintiff appeals, her pay-off equals  (1-b).(-J) + (1-a).b.(J-J) + 
a.b.c.(-s’.J) + a.b.(1-c).(-J), with c being the probability that the appeal court will deem 
the defendant’s negligence greater than the plaintiff’s negligence, given that the trial 
court thought the opposite was true. The difference between appealing and not 
appealing for the plaintiff equals b.J + a.b.c.(-s’.J) + a.b.(1-c).(-J). In the second case, 
the parties share the loss. Both parties could have an incentive to appeal.  If the 
plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals – s.J. If the plaintiff appeals her pay-off 
equals (1-b).(-J) + (1-a).b.(J-J) + a.b.d.(-s’.J) + a.b.(1-d).(-J),  with d the probability that 
the appeal court will deem the defendant’s negligence greater than the plaintiff’s 
negligence, given that the trial court thought so.  The difference between appealing 
and not appealing for the plaintiff equals (1-b).(-J) + (s - a.b.d.s’).J + a.b.(1-d).(-J). If 
the defendant does not appeal, her pay-off equals –(1-s).J. If she appeals, her pay-off 
equals -(1-a).b.J - a.b.d.(1-s’).J.  The difference between appealing and not appealing 
equals  –(1-a).b.J + ((1-s)-a.b.d.(1-s’)).J.  
 
 
Contributory negligence Comparative negligence Modified comparative negligence 
P: (1-a).b.J  P:  –(1-b).J + (s-a.b.s’).J 
 
D: –(1-a).b.J + ((1-s)-a.b.(1-
s’)).J 
Trial court decided that plaintiff’s 
negligence was greater: 
P: b.J + a.b.c.(-s’.J) + a.b.(1-c).(-J) 
 
Trial court decided that defendant’s 
negligence was greater: 
P: -(1-b).J + (s - a.b.d.s’).J - a.b.(1-d).J 
D: –(1-a).b.J + ((1-s)-a.b.d.(1-s’)).J 
 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant may have an incentive to appeal under pure 
comparative negligence, but this incentive may be quite limited compared to the 
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plaintiff’s incentive to appeal under contributory negligence. We can see this 
through a simple numerical example. Suppose the plaintiff has suffered a loss of 100. 
Under comparative negligence, if the trial court holds both parties negligent, each 
party will bear part of the loss (e.g. each 50). If the plaintiff can convince the 
appellate court that the defendant acted negligently but that he himself did not, his 
gain equals 50 (100-50). Under contributory negligence, his gain would equal 100 
(100-0). More formally, the plaintiff’s incentive to appeal is only smaller under 
contributory negligence than under comparative negligence if the following 
condition is satisfied: a.b.(1-s’) > 1-s. Regarding modified comparative negligence, in 
case the trial court decided the plaintiff’s negligence was greater, the plaintiff’s 
incentive to appeal is larger under modified comparative negligence than under 
contributory negligence: b.J + a.b.c.(-s’.J) + a.b.(1-c).(-J) = b.J – a.b.(s’.c + 1-c).J > b.J – 
a.b.J. The plaintiff’s incentive is larger under modified comparative negligence than 
under pure comparative negligence if a.b.(1-c).(1-s’) < 1–s.  In case the trial court 
decided that defendant’s negligence was greater, the plaintiff's incentive to appeal is 
smaller under modified comparative negligence than under pure comparative 
negligence, but the opposite is true for the defendant's incentive to appeal (because 
the modified form gives him an additional opportunity to escape liability, i.e. when 
he can convince the appellate court that his negligence was smaller than the 
plaintiff's negligence).   
  
 
2. The trial court only holds the defendant negligent 
 
Under all three rules, the defendant bears the entire loss. Only she can have an 
incentive to appeal. Under contributory negligence, if the defendant does not appeal, 
her pay-off equals – J. If the defendant appeals, her pay-off equals - (1-e).b.J, with e 
the probability that the appeal court will hold the plaintiff negligent given that the 
trial court did not, and b (still) the probability that the appeal court will hold the 
defendant negligent given that the trial court did. The difference between appealing 
and not appealing for the plaintiff equals  J – (1-e).b.J.  
 
Under pure comparative negligence, if the defendant does not appeal, her pay-off 
equals – J.  If the defendant appeals, her pay-off equals -(1-e).b.J - e.b.(1-s’).J. The 
difference between appealing and not appealing for the plaintiff equals J – (1-e).b.J – 
e.b.(1-s’).J.   
 
Under modified comparative negligence, if the defendant does not appeal her pay-
off equals –J. If the defendant appeals, her pay-off equals –(1-e).b.J – e.b.f.(1-s’).J, 
with f the probability that the appeal court will consider the defendant’s negligence 
to be greater than the plaintiff’s negligence, given the decision of the first instance 
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court. The difference between appealing and not appealing equals  J –(1-e).b.J – 
e.b.f.(1-s’).J.  
 
Contributory negligence Comparative negligence Modified comparative negligence 
 D: J – (1-e).b.J  D:   J – (1-e).b.J – e.b.(1-
s’).J 
 
D:  J –(1-e).b.J – e.b.f.(1-s’).J 
 
The incentive for the defendant to appeal is clearly greater under contributory 
negligence than under comparative negligence.   Under contributory negligence, the 
defendant has two possibilities to fully escape bearing any part of the loss: if he 
convinces the appellate court that he didn’t act negligently, or if he convinces the 
appellate court that the plaintiff acted negligently. Under comparative negligence, 
the defendant only escapes bearing the full loss if he convinces the appellate court 
that he didn’t act negligently. If he can only show that the plaintiff acted negligently 
as well, he will not fully escape bearing the loss.  The incentive to appeal is 
intermediate under modified comparative negligence.  
 
 
3. The trial court does not hold either party negligent 
Under all three rules, the plaintiff bears the entire loss. Only she can have an 
incentive to appeal.  
 
Under contributory negligence, if the plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals –J. 
If she appeals, her pay-off equals -(1-(1-e).g).J + (1-e).g.(J-J), with g the probability 
that the appeal court will hold the defendant liable, given that the trial court did not.  
The difference between appealing and not appealing equals  J – (1-(1-e).g).J. 
 
Under comparative negligence, if the plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals  -J. 
If she appeals, her pay-off equals –(1-g).J – e.g.s’.J. The difference between appealing 
and not appealing equals J – (1-g).J – e.g.s’.J.  
 
Under modified comparative negligence, if the plaintiff doesn’t appeal, her pay-off 
equals  -J. If she appeals, her pay-off equals –(1-g).J – e.g.h.s’.J – e.g.(1-h).J, with h the 
probability that the appeal court will consider the defendant’s negligence to be 
greater than the plaintiff’s negligence.  The difference between appealing and not 
appealing equals  J –(1-g).J – e.g.h.s’.J – e.g.(1-h).J.       
 
 
 
Contributory negligence Comparative negligence Modified comparative negligence 
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 P: J – (1-g).J – e.g.J 
 
 P: J – (1-g).J – e.g.s’.J P: J –(1-g).J – e.g.h.s’.J – e.g.(1-h).J 
 
The incentive to appeal for the plaintiff is clearly larger under comparative 
negligence than under contributory negligence, since the plaintiff will also be 
awarded something if both parties are found negligent under comparative 
negligence. The incentive to appeal under modified comparative negligence is 
intermediate.   
 
 
4. The trial court only holds the plaintiff negligent 
Under all three rules, the plaintiff bears the entire loss. Only she can have an 
incentive to appeal.  
 
Under contributory negligence, if the plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals –J. 
If she appeals, her pay-off equals  – (1 – (1-a).g).J. The difference between appealing 
and not appealing equals J – (1 – (1-a).g).J.   
 
Under comparative negligence, if the plaintiff does not appeal, her pay-off equals  -J. 
If she appeals, her pay-off equals – (1-g).J – a.g.s’.J. The difference between appealing 
and not appealing equals J – (1-g).J – a.g.s’.J.  
 
Under modified comparative negligence, if the plaintiff doesn’t appeal, her pay-off 
equals  -J. If she appeals, her pay-off equals – (1-g).J – a.g.i.s’.J – a.g.(1-i).J, with i the 
probability that the appeal court will find the defendant’s negligence greater than 
the plaintiff’s negligence. The difference between appealing and not appealing 
equals J – (1-g).J – a.g.i.s’.J – a.g.(1-i).J.  
 
Contributory negligence Comparative negligence Modified comparative negligence 
 P: J – (1-g).J –a.g.J  P: J – (1-g).J – a.g.s’.J 
 
P: J – (1-g).J – a.g.i.s’.J – a.g.(1-i).J 
  
 
It’s clear that the incentive of the plaintiff to appeal is greater under comparative 
negligence than under contributory negligence.  Under contributory negligence, the 
plaintiff needs to prove two things to obtain (full) compensation: that he didn’t act 
negligently and that the defendant did act negligently. Only then will the appellate 
court reverse the decision of the trial court. Under comparative negligence, the 
plaintiff also receives full compensation if he can show that he didn’t act negligently 
and that the defendant did act negligently. On top of that, he also recovers part of 
the loss if he can only prove that the defendant acted negligently. The incentive to 
appeal under modified comparative negligence is intermediate.   
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In conclusion, comparative negligence does not lower appeal rates for all types of 
cases. The overall effect will depend on which types of categories of cases (1,2,3 or 4) 
end up in the courts of first instance more frequently. Categories 1 and (especially) 2 
are likely to dominate.   The reason is that the vast majority of tort cases are motor 
vehicle cases. In these cases the plaintiff win rate is quite high.22  Shanley (1985) finds 
that for automobile accidents, in the vast majority of cases either (1) both parties are 
held liable, or (2) only the defendant is held liable, with category (2) much more 
common than category (1). Category 2 is the category in which the incentives to 
appeal are always smaller under comparative negligence than under contributory 
negligence.   
 
 
2.2.2. The incentive to file 
 
The fact that appeals are less frequently filed among the cases that have been decided by a 
trial court, does not automatically imply that comparative negligence will reduce the 
total appellate caseload compared to contributory negligence. Comparative 
negligence may increase the incentive to file a case in the trial courts because 
comparative negligence increases the expected value of a claim. This could lead to an 
increase in the total number of appeals, even though the appeal frequency may 
decrease.  
 
However, empirical research (e.g. Shanley, 1985) shows that under a contributory 
negligence rule, juries often deliberately did not hold a plaintiff, who was actually 
negligent, liable in order to avoid the harsh consequences of this rule. At the same 
time, in such cases juries did not allow these plaintiffs to receive full damages from 
negligent defendants. In other words, juries de facto applied a rule of comparative 
negligence.23 It is thus logical to conclude that the legal switch was unlikely to have 
an overwhelming effect on the number of filings.   Moreover, one has to take 
settlement incentives into account. An Arkansas study showed that the adoption of 
comparative negligence prompted no drastic change in trial court burden there. The 
change increased the incentive to sue but at the same time promoted more pretrial 
settlements. The report concluded that concern over court congestion should not be 
a factor in a State's decision to adopt comparative negligence (see Rosenberg, 1959;  
Thomson, 1969).   
                                               
22
 See for example Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 2005, 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf.  
23 Shanley studied 675 auto accident trials in San Francisco County in the 1970s, half before and half 
after California’s adoption of pure comparative. He created a statistical model based on a 
plaintiff/defendant negligence scale that he used to predict jury behavior in these cases. 
Awards under a properly-followed comparative rule would have been 92 percent higher 
than under a properly-followed contributory rule. However, the actual increase was only 
20 percent. 
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Obviously, these deliberate errors of juries regarding the plaintiff's negligence most 
likely increased the appeal rate under contributory negligence substantially.  We can 
see this by looking at the first case in our model above.  In cases in which the trial 
court holds both parties negligent, under contributory negligence only the plaintiff 
has an incentive to appeal, with a difference between appealing and not appealing of 
(1-a).b.J.24 Unless a is quite small and b is quite large, the incentive to appeal will not 
be extremely large. If juries would however try to mimick a rule of pure comparative 
negligence, both parties may have an incentive to appeal.25 If the plaintiff does not 
appeal, her pay-off equals -s.J. If she appeals, her pay-off equals -(1-(1-e).b).J.26 The 
difference between appealing and not appealing equals s.J-(1-(1-e).b).J.  The 
plaintiff's incentive to appeal may be quite small, because the chance that the 
appellate court will find him liable is large (e is quite large because the lower court 
deliberately disregarded the plaintiff's negligence; with a large e, s.J-(1-(1-e).b).J will 
often be negative). However, the defendant's incentive to appeal will be quite large, 
given the intentional error by the lower court (e will be large). If the defendant does 
not appeal, his pay-off is -(1-s).J. If he appeals, his pay-off equals -(1-e).b.J. The 
difference between appealing and not appealing is (1-s).J-(1-e).b.J. When e is close to 
1, the difference will approach (1-s).J.  
 
 
  
 
3. State Appellate Caseloads 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the period from 1969 onwards. By 1969, only 7 
states had adopted comparative negligence: Mississippi (1910, legislatively adopted 
the pure form)27, Georgia (1913, judicially adopted28 a modified form), Nebraska 
(1913, legislatively adopted a modified form29), Wisconsin (1931, legislatively 
adopted a modified form30), South Dakota (1941, legislatively adopted a modified 
form31), Arkansas (1955, legislatively adopted a modified form32) and Maine (1965, 
                                               
24 With a the probability that the appeal court will hold the plaintiff negligent given that the trial court 
did, and b the probability that the appeal court will hold the defendant negligent given that the trial 
court did. 
25 We assume that appellate courts do not try to mimick comparative negligence.  
26 With e the probability that the appeal court will hold the plaintiff negligent given that the trial court 
did not. 
27 M.C.A. § 11-7-15. 
28 Note that Georgia’s legislature passed a law applying the comparative negligence rule to plaintiffs 
injured in railroad accidents. The Supreme Court then extended this rule to all accidents. See Curran 
(1992, fn 11).  
29 R.S.Neb. 25-1151. 
30 Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1931) 
31 SL 1941, ch 160.  
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legislatively adopted a modified form33). During these decades, appellate caseloads 
were quite low.34  It’s unlikely that caseloads influenced the adoption of comparative 
negligence in that period.  Schwartz (1986) provides a reason for the adoption of 
comparative negligence for two states, Mississippi and Wisconsin. They seemed to 
have adopted comparative negligence as a way to forestall the adoption of 
workmen’s compensation laws.  Between 1940 and 1969, there were many failed 
efforts in many state legislatures to adopt comparative negligence.35  According to 
many commentators, major corporate defendants and insurance companies helped 
to block comparative negligence legislation because of the concern that it would be 
too costly.36  
 
Since 1969, twelve states made the switch to comparative negligence judicially. Nine 
of these states changed to pure comparative negligence (Alaska, California, Florida, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri and New Mexico) and three to a 
modified form (South Carolina, Tennessee and West-Virginia). Twenty-seven states 
made the switch through legislation. Five states changed to a pure form (Arizona, 
Louisiana, New York, Rhode Island and Washington) and twenty-two to a modified 
form (Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,  North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont and 
Wyoming). The District of Columbia and 4 states (Alabama, Maryland, North 
Carolina and Virginia) still use the rule of contributory negligence.  Table 1 provides 
information related to each state’s negligence rule.  
 
Table 1: 
State Negligence Rule 
State Year Adopted Adopted By 
Contributory Negligence 
Alabama   
District of Columbia   
Maryland   
North Carolina   
Virginia   
Pure Comparative Negligence 
Mississippi 1910 Legislature 
Rhode Island 1971 Legislature 
Florida 1973 Court 
                                                                                                                                                  
32 No. 191, [1955] Ark. Acts. 443 (repealed 1957). 
33 1965 Me.Laws, Pub. L., ch. 424. 
34 See Marvell (1983). 
35 E.g. in New York in 1947, in Michigan in 1947. In 1950, sixteen states attempted to pass comparative 
negligence, without success. See Schwartz (1986).  
36 See Schwartz (1986). 
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Washington 1973 Legislature 
Alaska 1975 Court 
California 1975 Court 
New York 1975 Legislature 
Louisiana 1979 Legislature 
Michigan 1979 Court 
Illinois 1981 Court 
New Mexico 1981 Court 
Iowa 1982 Court 
Missouri 1983 Court 
Arizona 1984 Legislature 
Kentucky 1984 Court 
Modified Comparative Negligence 
Georgia 1913 Court 
Nebraska 1913 Legislature 
Wisconsin 1931 Legislature 
South Dakota 1941 Legislature 
Arkansas 1955 Legislature 
Maine 1965 Legislature 
Hawaii 1969 Legislature 
Massachusetts 1969 Legislature 
Minnesota 1969 Legislature 
New Hampshire 1969 Legislature 
Vermont 1969 Legislature 
Colorado 1971 Legislature 
Idaho 1971 Legislature 
Oregon 1971 Legislature 
Connecticut 1973 Legislature 
Nevada 1973 Legislature 
New Jersey 1973 Legislature 
North Dakota 1973 Legislature 
Oklahoma 1973 Legislature 
Texas 1973 Legislature 
Utah 1973 Legislature 
Wyoming 1973 Legislature 
Kansas 1974 Legislature 
Montana 1975 Legislature 
Pennsylvania 1976 Legislature 
West Virginia 1979 Court 
Ohio 1980 Legislature 
Delaware 1984 Legislature 
Indiana 1985 Legislature 
South Carolina 1991 Court 
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Tennessee 1992 Court 
 
 
In the remainder of this section, we focus on some broad tendencies that the data 
unveil.   First, Supreme Court caseloads in states that adopted the pure form of 
comparative negligence were often very large. For example, the California Supreme 
Court adopted a pure comparative negligence rule in 1975.37 In that year, Supreme 
Court caseloads were amongst the highest of all states (524 filings per judge). The 
great majority of states had much lower caseloads. Florida judicially implemented a 
rule of pure comparative negligence in 1973.38 At the time of adoption, Supreme 
Court caseloads were higher than they were in Florida in only a handful of states. 
Louisiana adopted pure comparative negligence legislatively in 1979.39 In that year, 
the caseload of the Supreme Court of Louisiana was very high compared to the great 
majority of other states (406 filings per judge). The caseload had increased 
substantially between 1975 and 1979. In 1975, there were “only” 229 filings per 
judge.  
 
Second, the differences between states that chose a pure form and states that chose a 
modified form are quite substantial. Appellate caseloads in pure comparative 
negligence states were often high to very high.  For the many states that adopted a 
modified form of comparative negligence, the caseloads were comparably low. For 
example, Oklahoma adopted a modified form of comparative negligence in 1973. 
The number of filings per judge for the Supreme Court was 98. Delaware changed to 
modified comparative negligence in 1984. The caseload in the Delaware Supreme 
Court in that year was quite modest: 66 cases filed per judge.     
 
Third, focusing on the states that did not introduce any form of comparative 
negligence, around the period that many states shifted to comparative negligence 
(early-mid seventies), appellate caseloads were quite low in Alabama (41 filings per 
judge in 1975), North Carolina (74 filings per judge in 1975) and Maryland (108 
filings per judge in 1975).40 After 1975, the caseload never increased dramatically in 
these states.41  
                                               
37 Liv v. Yellow Cab, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). 
38 Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431. The rule is now laid down in a statute (F.S.A. § 768.81(2)) 
39 Louisiana Act No. 431. 
40 They were a bit higher in Virginia and the District of Columbia, but the appellate courts in these 
states have some quite rare characteristics. In Virginia, both the Supreme Court and the intermediate 
appellate courts have discretionary jurisdiction over the vast majority of their caseload. For the 
Supreme Court, there’s only discretionary jurisdiction in civil cases (only a few other state Supreme 
Courts share this characteristic).  The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, with its nine 
justices, often sits in panels of three, which significantly reduces the workload. In most states, the 
Supreme Court justices sit en banc. 
41 In the last years, there seem to be some problems for the court of last resort to keep up with the 
caseloads in Maryland (the ratio of outgoing as a percent of incoming cases was 85% in 2008).  
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4. Empirics 
 
To examine our hypothesis more carefully, we use the data on state appeal caseloads 
to predict the adoption of comparative negligence in each state.  We use data on the 
number of appeals in the state’s appellate court of last resort divided by the number 
of judges on that court to provide a metric of how busy each judge is. These data 
come from yearly reports of the National Center of State Courts.  Note that the 
reports start only from the year 1975. However, the 1976 report provides 
comprehensive data for the period 1967-1974 for many states.    Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Source 
Appellate 
Caseload 
Total cases filed in state’s 
appellate court of last 
resort in a given year 
1,387 1,452 National 
Center for 
State Courts 
Appellate 
Caseload Per 
Judge 
Appellate caseload 
divided by the number of 
judges on state appellate 
court of last resort 
209 171 National 
Center for 
State Courts 
Standardized 
Appellate 
Caseload 
(Appellate caseload per 
judge – mean appellate 
caseload per 
judge)/standard deviation 
of appellate caseload per 
judge 
0 1 National 
Center for 
State Courts 
Constant 
Income Per 
Capita 
State per capita income in 
constant thousands of 
dollars 
13 4 Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
Violent Crime 
Per Judge 
The number of violent 
crimes committed in the 
state in the given year 
divided by the number of 
judges on the appellate 
4,177 6,186 Bureau of 
Justice 
Statistics 
                                                                                                                                                  
Recently, the Maryland Court of Appeals Chief Justice Robert Bell made a request to have the 
Judiciary undertake a study of comparative fault and determine whether the comparative fault 
standard could be adopted in Maryland via a judicial rule. See 
http://conduitstreet.mdcounties.org/2011/04/19/session-wrap-up-government-liability-legislation/.  
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court of last resort 
Standardized 
violent crime 
per judge 
(Violent crime per judge – 
mean violent crime per 
judge)/standard deviation 
of violent crime per judge 
0 1 Bureau of 
Justice 
Statistics 
 
 
 
Given that some states switched prior to the existence of appeals court data and the 
fact that some states have not switched, we estimate hazard models that allow for 
censoring.  We do not impose a parametric trend on the data, instead allowing for 
common year fixed effects to account for the apparent tendency of many states to 
make the switch in the same year.  Essentially, our semi-parametric model estimates 
the probability of adoption by state i in year t, conditional on the state having not 
adopted comparative negligence in a year before t.  To account for dependence 
within a state, we cluster the standard errors at the state level. 
 
Table 3 provides some baseline results.  To account for economic effects that may 
also help determine the switch we provide a specification that controls for deflated 
state per capita income as well. 
 
Table 3: Appellate Caseload and the Adoption of Comparative Negligence 
Semi-Parametric Hazard Model 
(Standard errors clustered by state) 
 (i) (ii) 
Standardized Appellate 
caseload per Judge 
1.01 
(0.38)*** 
1.01 
(0.39)** 
Deflated per capita income  0.01 
(0.02) 
Marginal Effect for 
Standardized Caseload  
0.18 0.18 
Note: Model estimates the probability of adoption of comparative negligence in year 
t conditional on having not adopted by year t-1 using a probit model that includes 
year fixed effects. 
**p < 0.05 (two tailed test of zero coefficient) 
***p < 0.01 (two tailed test of zero coefficient)    
We find that an increase in a state’s appellate caseload of one standard deviation 
increases its likelihood of adopting comparative negligence by more than 18 percent.  
This effect is statistically significant at better than the 1 percent level. 
 
There may be a concern that appeals rates are endogenous to other factors that lead 
to a state’s adoption of comparative negligence.  To address this possibility, we note 
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that appeals rate surged in this time period primarily due to an increase in criminal 
appeals.  This suggests the use of violent crime, since violent crimes are much more 
likely to lead to appeals, as an instrument for the appeals workload.  Since violent 
crime should be orthogonal to the forces affecting the civil law system, this approach 
should help us isolate the causal effect of the appeals workload on the adoption of 
comparative negligence.  We present results from this approach in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Appellate Caseload Instrumented by Violent Crime 
Semi-Parametric IV Hazard Model 
(Standard errors clustered by state) 
 First Stage Second Stage 
Standardized Appellate 
caseload per Judge 
 1.71 
(0.51)*** 
Standardized Violent 
crime per Judge 
0.72 
(0.06)*** 
 
Deflated per capita income -0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Marginal Effect for 
Standardized Caseload  
 0.18 
Note: Model estimates the probability of adoption of comparative negligence in year 
t conditional on having not adopted by year t-1 using a probit model that includes 
year fixed effects.  The first stage regression includes the year fixed effects as well. 
***p < 0.01 (two tailed test of zero coefficient)    
 
 
Although our instrument appears to be quite strong with a t statistic exceeding 11, 
and it generates a coefficient with respect to the appellate workload metric of the 
predicted sign, we find no change in the estimated marginal effect of the relationship 
between caseload and the adoption of comparative negligence.  This suggests that 
our original estimates do not suffer from an omitted variables bias.  From this, we 
infer that increasing a state’s appellate caseload by one standard deviation increases 
the likelihood it adopts comparative negligence by 18 percent. 
 
Our hypothesis applies most strongly to the pure form of comparative negligence 
since the modified form maintains much of the discrete nature of contributory 
negligence.  That is, for plaintiffs above the 50 percent negligence threshold, there 
will still be a strong incentive to appeal, as indicated by the statements found in the 
cases discussed above.  For that reason, we reexamine the regressions above, using 
the adoption of pure comparative negligence as the outcome of the hazard functions.  
For this analysis, we censor observations once a state adopts modified comparative 
negligence on the assumption that these states effectively leave the risk set when 
making this choice (i.e., it is unlikely that they will later switch to pure comparative 
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negligence).  For the IV specification, we use the same instrument as described 
above.  We present these results in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: The Adoption of Pure Comparative Negligence 
Semi-Parametric IV Hazard Model 
(Standard errors clustered by state) 
 OLS IV 
Standardized Appellate 
caseload per Judge 
1.44 
(0.50)*** 
1.83 
(0.54)*** 
Deflated per capita income 0.21 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
Marginal Effect for 
Standardized Caseload 
0.29 0.27 
Note: Model estimates the probability of adoption of comparative negligence in year 
t conditional on having not adopted by year t-1 using a probit model that includes 
year fixed effects.  The first stage regression includes the year fixed effects as well. 
***p < 0.01 (two tailed test of zero coefficient)    
   
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the effect of the appeals workload is larger with 
respect to the adoption of pure comparative negligence than it is with respect to 
comparative negligence generally.  In the case of any comparative negligence, the 
effect of a standard deviation increase in appeals per judge is 0.18, while it is 0.27 
with respect to the adoption of pure comparative negligence. 
 
While our hypothesis is stronger in the case of pure comparative negligence, at least 
within the range of cases where the plaintiff’s negligence is under 50 percent, the 
switch to comparative negligence may reduce the likelihood of appeal and, 
therefore, be somewhat attract to judges wishing to reduce their workload.  We can 
examine the switch to both forms of comparative negligence by estimating a 
competing risks hazard model where a state leaves the risk set when it adopts any 
form of comparative negligence, but we can still separate the effect of appeals 
workload on the shift to the different forms of comparative negligence.  We present 
the results of this analysis in Table 6.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Contributory vs. Modified Comparative vs. Pure Comparative 
Competing Risks Semi-Parametric Hazard Model 
(Standard errors clustered by state) 
Base Category Contributory Negligence 
 Modified Comparative 
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Appellate caseload per 
Judge 
1.08 
(1.05) 
 Pure Comparative 
Appellate caseload per 
Judge 
2.89 
(1.03)*** 
p value for test of equality 
of coefficients 
0.19 
Note: Model estimates the probability of adoption of modified or pure comparative 
negligence in year t conditional on having not adopted either form of comparative 
negligence by year t-1 using a multinomial logit model that includes year fixed 
effects and deflated per capita income. 
***p < 0.01 (two tailed test of zero coefficient)    
 
As suggested, the coefficients for both outcomes are positive, but the coefficient for 
the adoption of pure comparative negligence is substantially larger.  Further, the 
coefficient on the appeals workload is statistically significant with respect to the 
adoption of pure comparative negligence but not for the adoption of the modified 
form. 
 
These results are consistent with the idea that states were more likely to adopt 
comparative negligence, especially in its pure form, as their appellate caseloads 
grew.  Presumably this was done as a way to reduce the workload of appellate 
judges, consistent with a model of self-interested judicial behavior. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
States with large appellate caseloads were more likely to adopt pure comparative 
negligence compared to states with lower appellate caseloads, which either adopted 
a modified form of comparative negligence, or left their rule of contributory 
negligence unaltered.  This is consistent with a model of judicial behavior wherein 
judges seek to reduce their own workload using the tools available to them.  In this 
case, the tool involves changing substantive law, or using their influence to induce 
the state legislature to change the law for them. 42   
 
This analysis helps to fill a gap in the law and economics of torts literature which has 
previously had difficulty explaining the movement toward comparative negligence, 
given that its effect on incentives is unclear while substantially increasing litigation 
costs.  While our results could be driven by background trends or other omitted 
variables, a plausible instrumental variables approach yields comparable results.   
                                               
42 For an interest group perspective on the judiciary where judges lobby the legislature see Anderson, 
Shughart and Tollison (1989). 
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